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Abstract
Relationships between health professionals and pharmaceutical manufacturers can unduly influence clinical practice. 
These relationships are the focus of global transparency efforts, including in Europe. We conducted a descriptive 
content analysis of the transparency provisions implemented by February 2017 in nine European Union (EU) countries 
concerning payments to health professionals, with duplicate independent coding of all data. Using an author-generated, 
semi-structured questionnaire, we collected information from each disclosure policy/code on: target industries, 
categories of healthcare professionals covered, scope of payments included, location and searchability of the disclosed 
data. Our analysis shows that although important improvements have been put in place in the past few years, significant 
gaps remain in disclosure requirements and their implementation. The situation differs substantially from country to 
country and the most striking differences are between governmental and self-regulatory approaches, especially with 
regard to the comprehensiveness of the disclosed data. In many cases, individuals can still opt out and reporting is 
incomplete, with common influential gifts such as food and drink excluded. Finally, in several countries data are only 
available as separate PDFs from companies, thus making the payment reports difficult to access and analyse. In order 
to overcome these gaps, minimum standards for disclosures should be implemented across Europe. All payments 
to healthcare professionals and organizations should be included, all health-related industries should be required to 
submit reports, and usability of disclosed data should be guaranteed.
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Background
Financial ties between health professionals and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have long been at the centre of international 
debate. Pharmaceutical companies invest large sums of money 
to interact with health professionals; in 2013, 20 drug companies 
spent a total of $14.8 billion in promotion, including traditional 
detailing, journal advertising, e-promotion, and professional 
meetings.1 Studies suggest that such relationships influence 
clinical practice and are associated with inappropriate and 
lower quality prescribing that can lead to negative effects on 
patient care and higher healthcare costs.2,3
These concerns have led to a range of national policies aimed to 
ensure greater disclosure of payments to health professionals 
by pharmaceutical manufacturers. For example, in 2013 the 
United States implemented the “Physician Payments Sunshine 
Act,” legislation passed in 2010 that requires drug and device 
companies to declare payments and hospitality to medical 
doctors and teaching hospitals.4 In Europe, the situation is still 
heterogeneous, with only some countries adopting legislation 
governing disclosure. A turning point has been the adoption 
in June 2013 of a Disclosure Code by the European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), 
the trade association of the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry. Since 2013, all 33 national industry associations 
that are EFPIA members – including five not European Union 
(EU) member states – have been mandated to implement 
disclosure programs.5 Disclosure rules must follow EFPIA 
guidelines, but exceptions are allowed when these provisions 
are in conflict with national laws or regulations.
The aim of this study is therefore to examine rules covering 
disclosure by pharmaceutical companies of their payments 
to health professionals in different European countries, in 
terms of comprehensiveness and ease of data access. We also 
make recommendations for the types of minimum standards 
needed for more comprehensive reporting standards. 
Methods
We conducted a descriptive content analysis of the national 
transparency provisions implemented by February 2017 in 
nine European countries and the provisions in the EFPIA code 
concerning payments to health professionals, with duplicate 
independent coding of all data, and any discrepancies resolved 
by consensus. If consensus could not be reached, coders 
consulted the study authors with a translation of the relevant 
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text. This group of nine countries includes four countries 
from Western Europe (France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom), one from Eastern Europe (Latvia), one 
from Northern Europe (Sweden), and three from Southern 
Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
This convenience sample was chosen for regional variation, 
a mix of legislated and self-regulatory approaches, 
and availability of native-language data collectors with 
background knowledge of pharmaceutical policy. A call for 
data collectors was circulated among members of Health 
Action International, a non-governmental organisation 
representing the public interest in pharmaceutical policy, 
and the International Society of Drug Bulletins, a network 
of independent journals on therapeutics. In order to identify 
the codes/policies, each coder was provided with a paper 
that provides a brief overview of transparency regulations 
implemented in European countries.6 As the paper was 
published in 2014, coders were asked to conduct additional 
searches to identify new initiatives adopted since then. 
The focus of these searches was on government-led rules 
on payments disclosure (ie, in legislation/regulation) and 
self-regulatory initiatives (ie, in ethics codes of national 
pharmaceutical industry associations).
We designed a semi-structured questionnaire based on 
variables of theoretical interest based on the literature on 
industry-professional interactions and on previous analyses 
of transparency provisions.6-8 The questionnaire was pilot-
tested within the research team. 
From each policy/code, we collected the following information 
(see Supplementary file 1): 
• general information (name of the code, organisation 
responsible, date of adoption); 
• type of policy (governmental or self-regulatory) and 
applicability;
• target industries (eg, pharmaceutical, medical device 
industries, other health-related industries);
• categories of healthcare organisations and professionals 
covered (eg, medical doctors, pharmacists, nurses);
• provisions for reporting of individual data (eg, whether 
the consent of the recipient was required for publishing 
payments to named individual health professionals); 
• scope of payments covered and presence of financial 
thresholds for reporting; 
• location, searchability and user-friendliness of the data 
(user-friendliness was defined as the data collectors’ 
judgement on the format and usability of the data);
• sanctions for non-disclosure and monitoring of 
compliance.
We then conducted a descriptive data analysis, with a focus on 
differences between government and industry self-regulation, 
and on their strengths and limitations. 
Results
The Table provides an overview of the included policies. 
Additional information is available in Supplementary file 
2. The focus of our analysis is primarily on rules covering 
disclosure by pharmaceutical companies of their payments to 
health professionals, but as shown in the Table, the codes also 
include requirements on disclosure of payments to healthcare 
organisations.
We have included 10 policies from nine countries (two from 
Latvia). Of the nine included countries, only three have 
legislation in place. France adopted a “Sunshine Policy” 
in 2011, Portugal and Latvia adopted laws mandating 
public disclosure in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Five other 
included countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK) 
have adopted a self-regulatory approach, in most cases 
following the adoption of the EFPIA Disclosure Code in mid-
2013. In those countries there are no government-imposed 
disclosure requirements and the industry has developed its 
own transparency measures. Exceptions to implementing the 
EFPIA Disclosure Code might be allowed in countries where 
there are national laws or regulations in place. For example, 
the Code of the French industry association, Les Entreprises 
du médicament (LEEM), states that by applying the French 
law, it fulfils its obligations under the EFPIA Disclosure code.9 
In Latvia, in contrast, governmental and industry regulations 
coexist, with complementary roles. National regulations 
cover sponsorship of educational and scientific events only; 
industry self-regulation covers a broader range of payments 
to individual healthcare professionals and organisations. 
Finally, the Netherlands has a mixed self-regulatory system 
with some government involvement. Transparency provisions 
were implemented in 2012 by the Foundation for the Code 
of Pharmaceutical Advertising (CGR), a multi-stakeholder, 
self-regulatory organisation. Unlike other parts of the CGR 
code, the transparency provisions do not have a legal basis. 
However, the database of industry payments was set up with 
financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Health.
With regard to the scope of the transparency provisions, in 
France and Portugal the reporting requirements apply not 
only to the pharmaceutical industry but also to the medical 
device industry (and, in France, also other healthcare 
industries). Instead most of the voluntary codes apply only to 
members of the national industry trade associations, which 
are mainly research-based companies, although in some cases 
non-member companies might have chosen to abide by the 
rules. All the codes we analysed covered a broad range of 
categories of health professionals, including doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists, and in four countries also trainees. 
With regard to the disclosure of individual data, under 
French, Portuguese and Latvian laws, individuals who receive 
payments cannot refuse disclosure. On the other hand, five 
of the voluntary codes include an “opt-out” clause whereby 
health professionals can choose not to have their name 
publicly reported consistent with national data protection laws 
(eg, the UK Data Protection Act 1998 which requires health 
professionals’ consent before publishing information).10 These 
payments are then published in aggregate. 
Differences exist in the types of payments included and 
excluded from reporting. France has a threshold of €10 for 
individual reports, whereas in the Netherlands this threshold 
is €500 per company per year. While some categories of 
payments tend to be disclosed under most codes/policies (eg, 
sponsorship to attend meetings, travel and accommodation 
costs), the reporting of certain categories of payments 
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Table. Characteristics of the Transparency Provisions in Different EU Member States
DE ES FR IT LVa NL SE UK PT EFPIAb
Type of policy
Industry self-regulation Y Y Y Y Yc Y Y Y
Government Y Y Y
Target industries
Pharmaceutical industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Medical device industries Y Yd Y
Health professionals covered
Physicians Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-physicians Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Organisations covered (eg, hospitals, medical centres, Universities, medical societies)
Y Y Y Y Ye Y Yf Y Y Y Y
Individual data
Mandatory data release Yg Y Y Y Y
Consent required Y Y Y Y Y Y
Threshold for disclosure
N N
Y
€10
N N N
Y
€500/year 
per company
N N
Y
€60 N
Types of payments excluded from disclosure
Meals and drinks Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Drug samples Y Y Y Yh Y Y Y Y Y Y
Transfers of value related to OTC drugs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Small gifts, education or promotional 
materials
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other # ♦ *
Location of the data and searchability
Centralised searchable registry Y N/Ai
Centralised searchable registry with no 
possibility for data extraction
Yj Yj Y
Separate PDFs or weblinks on a single 
website 
Y Y Y N/A
Separate PDFs on each company 
website
Y Y Y Y N/A
Data access judged to be user-friendly
N N N N N N Partial N Y Partial N/A
Abbreviations: DE, Germany; ES, Spain; FR, France; IT, Italy; LV, Latvia; NL, The Netherlands; SE, Sweden; UK, United Kingdom; PT, Portugal; EFPIA, European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations; EU, European Union; OTC, over-the-counter.
a In Latvia governmental and industry regulation coexists, with complementary roles. 
b The EFPIA Code is included for comparison with national codes.
c Mixed: Code developed by a multi-stakeholder organisation, CGR, with support for the central database by the Dutch Ministry of Health and management by 
an independent foundation (Stichting Transparantieregister Zorg). 
d Payments from medical devices companies reported as of 2016; governed by another Code (not assessed for the purpose of this paper). 
e Does not cover universities but covers foundations or associations affiliated to universities.
f Only covers organisations that subscribe to the Code; others can join on a voluntarily basis. 
g Payments made from January 1, 2017 do not require prior individual consent by Healthcare Professionals and will be published on an individual basis except 
for transfers of value related to R&D which will remain being published on an aggregate basis.
h Samples reported under different regulatory requirements.
i Mandates publication on a publicly available platform, either on a company website or centralised. 
j Partly searchable. In the Netherlands, searching is possible by beneficiary, not by company. 
# Only the following payments are covered: organising and sponsorship of promotional and scientific events attended by specialists (includes travel and 
accommodation); support to specialist professional associations and medical institutions for scientific or professionally oriented event.
♦Research costs excluded, except for some non-interventional research. 
* Cost of travel, accommodation or fees for conference participation are irrelevant (although not formally excluded) as this is not allowed in the Swedish 
industry code.
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varies between countries. For example, in the Netherlands 
sponsorships for most research and development activities do 
not fall within the scope of the assessed disclosure obligations, 
while the EFPIA Code recommends to disclose them but only 
on an aggregate basis. Other categories of payments fall within 
a grey area; for example, the reporting of fees for services in 
France, despite being mandated by law, is still inconsistent. 
Food and drink are consistently excluded from reporting 
under most self-regulatory schemes, as the EFPIA Code does 
not require these payments to be reported. 
With regard to the location and searchability of the data, only 
the United Kingdom has a searchable central registry, from 
which data may also be extracted for analysis. In France, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal the registry is searchable but 
data cannot be extracted. Under the Latvian governmental 
regulation, the reports are published as separate PDFs on 
the Health Inspectorate webpage and under voluntary codes 
in Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain, and Latvia, data are only 
available on each individual company’s website or as separate 
PDFs on the industry association’s webpage. 
For six of the countries, data access was not deemed to be 
user-friendly. Only for one country, the United Kingdom, did 
the coders judge data access to be user-friendly. In Portugal 
and the Netherlands coders judged data access to be partially 
user-friendly. For example, data cannot be extracted and in 
the Netherlands it is not possible to search by company. 
With regard to sanctions, all the codes that are entirely 
voluntary treat non-disclosure as a breach of the code of 
conduct and treat sanctions similarly as for other breaches. 
Finally, in most of the countries monitoring is passive and 
based on receipt of complaints.
Discussion
Summary of Findings
This analysis of transparency provisions implemented in 
nine European countries shows that although important 
improvements have been put in place in the past few years, 
significant gaps remain in disclosure requirements and their 
implementation. The situation differs substantially from 
country to country and the most striking differences are 
between governmental and self-regulatory approaches. 
First, which health industries are included? While 
governmental provisions apply to all the companies operating 
in a country, most of the self-regulatory schemes apply only 
to members of a specific industry trade associations. This 
means that the available reports likely underestimate the 
true extent of pharmaceutical industry funding to healthcare 
professionals and organizations. 
Secondly, is disclosure of individual data mandatory and 
complete? The majority of the voluntary codes include 
an “opt-out” clause, through a requirement for individual 
consent, that undermines the meaning of a transparency 
policy. 
Thirdly, are reports comparable in terms of the types of 
payments included and excluded from reporting? Large 
differences exist; of particular interest is the consistent 
exclusion of food and drink under most self-regulatory 
schemes. These exclusions mean that a large proportion 
of industry payments to health professionals remain invisible. 
Fourthly, are the data provided in a centralised and searchable 
database? In most of the countries data are only available as 
separate PDFs, thus not allowing researchers, the public and 
the media to access and search this information in a single 
analysable database. 
Finally, was data access deemed to be user-friendly? Only 
for one of nine countries, the United Kingdom, the coders 
unequivocally judged the data to be user-friendly, but this was 
based on a brief assessment and other analysts have raised 
serious concerns about UK data quality and incomplete 
documentation.10
Comparison to Similar Studies
In this detailed analysis of nine countries, we found that 
there are widespread inconsistencies between countries. 
These findings are confirmed by an overview of transparency 
provisions in 35 States across the European region, including 
some non-EU countries, published in 2017 by Mental Health 
Europe, a non-governmental organization.7 The report 
had a different focus compared to our study: it provided a 
brief overview country by country, mapping not only their 
“Sunshine” policies/codes but also anti-corruption laws. 
Also, it focused not only on transparency rules targeting the 
pharmaceutical industry but also on provisions requiring 
healthcare professionals to report payments or benefits. The 
study found that ten countries have either laws (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Portugal, Slovakia) or regulations (Greece, 
Latvia, Romania, Turkey, UK) governing transparency by 
the industry or health professionals, and nine countries have 
anti-corruption legislation (Croatia, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, UK). Despite the 
broader focus, the report confirmed that although substantial 
improvements have been made in the past few years, there 
are still wide differences with some countries opting for 
legally-binding solutions and others relying on industry-self-
regulations which have limitations in terms of membership 
coverage and the need for the recipients’ consent in order to 
publish the data.7 
Limitations
Our study has a number of limitations. First, we included 
only nine European countries. The decision to rely on native-
language data collectors on one hand limited the number of 
included countries but on the other hand guaranteed greater 
accuracy. Second, since our focus was on research-based 
pharmaceutical industry payments to health professionals, 
we did not analyse self-regulatory codes developed by 
other industry sectors (eg, generic medicines, over-the-
counter (OTC) medicines and medical devices). Third, we 
only examined rules covering disclosure by pharmaceutical 
companies of their payments to health professionals therefore 
we did not include provisions that require health professionals 
to disclose payments by drug manufacturers. Fourth, we 
analysed transparency provisions implemented by February 
2017 and some policies might have already changed at the 
time of writing as this is a rapidly evolving policy area. 
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How to Ensure Greater Transparency
Our analysis has several implications for future policy 
initiatives. Minimum standards for transparency reporting are 
needed across Europe. This would be best achieved through 
EU legislation that is implemented by each Member State, 
ensuring harmonisation among countries without existing 
policies. For the countries that already have legislation in 
place, harmonisation should only be required if current 
legislation is to a lower standard than what is envisioned. 
European legislation would also cover all the companies 
operating in the Member States and not only those affiliated 
to a specific industry trade association, as is the case with self-
regulatory schemes.
Ideally, national databases should be combined in a single pan-
European user-friendly searchable and downloadable database 
with a platform that is accessible in a variety of languages. With 
standardised reporting criteria, this is achievable without an 
undue administrative burden on companies. Moreover, the 
dominant pharmaceutical companies, in terms of market 
share, are transnational corporations whose practices are 
likely to be similar across different countries. All payments 
to healthcare professionals and organizations should be 
included, and all health-related industries should be required 
to submit reports at a minimum on an annual basis, whether 
or not they have provided funding to healthcare professionals 
or organizations. Currently, a company’s failure to report may 
reflect either non-compliance or a lack of payments. 
The option for individuals to opt out of transparency reporting 
is a loophole in industry self-regulation that needs to be 
closed across Europe; this option has allowed only 48% of the 
payments to be linked to individuals in the United Kingdom in 
2015,11 increasing to 60% of payments in 2016.12 Transparency 
provisions should not allow health professionals to decide if 
they want their payments disclosed; health professionals have 
the option to forego industry financing if they wish to avoid 
reporting. Another loophole is in monitoring of compliance: 
without monitoring, it is unclear whether companies’ reports 
are comprehensive or accurate. In 2016, the Japanese firm 
Astellas reported a discovery of omissions in its transparency 
reports in the United Kingdom within the context of an 
investigation into a marketing violation.13 This incidental 
discovery raises questions about how widespread such 
inaccuracies are. 
Similarly to the Open Payments in the United States (the 
federal database created to administer the disclosure 
requirements of the “Sunshine Act”), the transparency 
reports should contain a number of variables that provide 
information on the products in relation to which the payment 
was made (eg, product codes, names and therapeutic areas) 
and on the recipient healthcare professional (eg, a unique 
identification number that link physicians’ records across 
program years and, possibly, to prescribing databases). This 
would enable researchers to further explore the association 
between industry payments to physicians and the cost and 
quality of prescribing. 
Finally, additional research is needed on how differences in 
transparency provisions affect public information access on 
industry payments to health professionals. If the national 
differences described above reflect lack of adequate evidence 
on how best to ensure transparency, researchers can take 
advantage of the natural experiment created by these 
differences to resolve this question. 
Beyond Transparency
Transparency reporting is an important and necessary step but 
it is not a solution to undue influence from industry financing 
of health professionals. Such influence has been demonstrated 
both in relation to funding of ‘key opinion leaders’ via advisory 
board membership, speaker fees and contracts,14 and the 
ubiquitous everyday gifts of food and drink and invitations to 
events that feature in transparency databases.15,16 There is also 
some evidence of a “dose-response” in the relationship between 
funding and prescribing rates, with higher prescribing costs 
and more brand-name prescriptions among physicians in the 
highest quintile of industry funding,17 as well as increased 
prescribing of promoted products in relation to the numbers 
of meals received.15
To address influence, restrictions on funding are needed, not 
just reporting transparency. France, for example, has already 
taken the first steps in prohibiting sales representatives from 
providing physicians who are working in an outpatient 
setting with free samples and gifts, including gifts of food, 
with additional restrictions on marketing within hospitals.18 
Additionally, since 2015, the Swedish industry code has 
prohibited member companies from paying for the cost 
of travel, accommodation or fees for participants at a 
conference.19 Such initiatives need to be extended and coupled 
with adequate education about pharmaceutical promotion in 
the medical curriculum and an increase in the funding for 
independent continuing professional education.
We now have an excellent evidence base, in large part due to 
the large-scale analyses that the US Sunshine Act has made 
possible, on the influence of industry funding on prescribing 
decisions.15 Funding that is known to exert undue influence 
has no place in provision of patient care, especially within a 
public healthcare system.
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